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Richard Devlin* Breach of Contract?: The New Economy,
Access to Justice and the Ethical
Responsibilities of the Legal Profession
In the last several years, there has been a growing awareness within the legal
profession that access to justice, that is, to legal advice and representation, is
becoming increasingly difficult. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the cuts to
legal aid programmes. The author argues that the response of the legal profession
is inadequate because it remains trapped in a welfarist paradigm of legal aid
that is insensitive to the impact of the new economy and the newly emergent
social investment state. The author explores the possibility of an alternative
response - the adoption of a mandatory pro bono system - and suggests that
both ethically and politically, given the realities of the social investment state, it is
the most justifiable strategy
Ces derniures anndes, les praticiens de la profession juridique sont devenus
conscients que I'acces I la justice devient de plus en plus difficile. Ayant subi
d'importantes compressions, les programmes d'aide juridique illustrent bien
I'acuit du probl6me. L'auteur soutient que la profession a 6t6 trop longue 6 la
d6tente. Dans sa forme actuelle, I'aide juridique procede d'une vision 6triqu6e
de I'assistance sociale qui ne tient pas compte de I'impact de la nouvelle 6conomie
et des nouvelles orientations de I'ftat en mati~re d'intervention sociale. L'auteur
explore une formule alternative notamment I'adoption d'un r6gime de services
b6n6voles obligatoires. II argue que, tant le plan 6thique que sur le plan politique,
cette strategie repond mieux aux imperatifs de la nouvelle politique
d'investissement social de I'Etat.
* Professor of Law, Dalhousie University. Thanks to Alexandra Dobrowolsky, Mark Doucet, Donna
Franey, Jodi Gallagher, Vita Houlihan, Tamara Lorincz, Wendy McKeen, Denis St Martin and espe-
cially Fiona McDonald. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at a national colloquium,
"Ethical Considerations in The New Economy: Inclusion or Exclusion?" Laurentian University,
October 2002. Research for this paper is current to March 2003.
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"I ... believe that the major challenge facing the justice system in the next
millennium will be the absence of adequate legal advice and legal repre-
sentation to our society's increasing numbers of disadvantaged."
- Roy McMurtry C.J.O. 1
"The legal system is grossly inequitable and inefficient. There is far too
much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those who
cannot."
- Derek Bok2
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions ...
[a member becomes] an officer of the court ... an instrument or agency
to advance the ends of justice."
- Benjamin Cardozo3
Horror stories abound about the many Canadians who do not have access
to the legal profession and therefore cannot protect their rights, not only in
the criminal sphere but also the civil sphere.4 Although the Canadian legal
profession has expressed significant concern, in general its response has
been inadequate, as evidenced by the tardy release of a disappointing
report by the CBA's Pro Bono Working Group.5 I will argue that this failure
can be traced to the fact that the Canadian legal profession is part of a
1. As quoted in Justice Casey Hill, The Self Represented Litigant in Criminal Cases (2002) [un-
published, on ile with authorI at 1.
2. As quoted in Roger C. Cramton, "Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans" (1994) 44
Case W Res. L. Rev. 531 at 533-534 [Cramton, "Ordinary Americans"]; The Marrero Report reiterates
the same point," ...the poor paradoxically live in circumstances in which they need legal services more
but can obtain them less." See "Final Report of the Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal
Services" (1991) 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 755 at 771. See also President Jimmy Carter, "No resources of talent
and training in our own society, even including the [sic] medical care, is more wastefully or unfairly
distributed than legal skills. Ninety per cent of our lawyers serve 10 per cent of our people. We are
overlawyered and under-represented" (as quoted in Roger C. Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono" (1991) 19
Hofstra L. Rev. 1113 at 1118-1119 [Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono"]).
3. People ex rel Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487 (N.Y. 1928) at 489-90.
4. The Canadian Bar Association has established Legal Aid Watch. This is an e-mail network of
legal aid lawyers who gather "horror stories" about how the legal aid system impacts the lives of real
people. The network aims to focus attention on governmental responsibility to improve access to
justice, improve the legal aid programme, raise the profile and portray the needs of clients and the
work of legal aid lawyers in a more sympathetic manner, and demonstrate the CBA's commitment to
access to justice and to establish a clearinghouse for information. The website contains a number of
"legal aid horror stories" and accounts of the actions the CBA is taking with regard to legal aid. See
online: Legal Aid Watch <http://www.cba.org/CBA/LAW/Main/>.
5. Canadian Bar Association Pro Bono Working Group, Pro Bono Working Group: Mid-Winter
2003 Report (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2003), online: Pro Bono Working Group <http://
www.cba.org/CBA/pdf/03-04-M-Background.pdf>. For further discussion see below at Part 111.2.
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larger economic, political, social and cultural formative context that is
sometimes called the new economy, and that the profession has not fully
considered the impact of this context.
In particular, I want to challenge one possible, indeed predictable,
response to the current dilemma. One could argue that little can be done to
remedy the problem of access to justice in the age of the new economy.
The legal profession is a business, and given the current pre-eminence of
market forces and the retreat by governments, there is no solution. I reject
this argument on two grounds. First, the "new economy" is not as fatalis-
tically predetermining as some analysts claim. Second, the legal profes-
sion, as a profession, is a special case that takes particular benefits from
aspects of the new economy, benefits that accrue in part because of the
privileged role that the state accords to it. I will argue that these benefits
engender reciprocal burdens and that the Canadian legal profession should
consider the adoption of a mandatory pro bono obligation. The problem of
access to justice then is not one of economic necessity, but of political and
normative will.
My argument will unfold in four stages. Part I outlines the nature of the
new economy, highlighting the key characteristics of a new state form -
"the social investment state" - and discussing the impact of these devel-
opments on the legal profession. Part II discusses the rise and relative
demise of legal aid in Canada. Part III analyses some recent responses by
the Canadian legal profession to the crisis in access to justice and can-
vasses the arguments for and against mandatory pro bono. Part IV argues
that we need a new strategy for the new economy, and locates the proposal
for mandatory pro bono in the larger political context of the social invest-
ment state. In short, my claim is that pro bono is not a charitable donation
but a professional obligation.6
I. The New Economy, The Social Investment State And The Legal Profession
The phrase "new economy" is amorphous, ideologically loaded and highly
contested. For some it is simply a way of describing a new configuration
of economic forces in contemporary society.7 For others it holds the promise
6. This paper focuses on the legal profession's obligations to individuals in need of legal assis-
tance. The other dimension to the pro bono argument is the provision of legal assistance to institu-
tions, such as charitable organizations. As I will argue later, pro bono for charitable organizations is
fraught with analytical and practical difficulties; hence, my focus is on the provision of legal ser-
vices to disadvantaged persons.
7. See generally "The New Economy" (2002) 3:1 Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research.
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of increased wealth, progress and even peace on a world wide scale.'
Yet others see it as just another version of capitalism that will increase
rather than decrease inequality, on both national and global levels.9
For the purposes of this paper, I will characterize the new economy as a
constellation of economic, political, social and cultural practices that are
reconfiguring wealth, knowledge and power in modem society. Although I
will restrict my focus to Canada because my particular subject matter is the
Canadian legal profession, I will attempt to analyse the contemporary Cana-
dian context in the light of the larger global forces that drive the new economy.
The economic dimensions of the new economy are familiar to most.
They include: technological innovations which have the capacity to com-
press time and space;' 0 globalization, with a particular emphasis on the
internationalization of trade;" the emergence of knowledge as a key source
of production and dynamo of economic wealth;' 2 and a commitment to the
discourses of the market: competition, efficiency, rationalization,
privitization, deregulation and team production. 3
For the purposes of this paper, however, it is important to emphasize
that the new economy is not just economic in nature; it is also inherently
political. By this I mean that the new economy inevitably has an impact
on, and is a consequence of, the distribution of wealth and power in soci-
ety. Two points can be noted in this regard. First, there can be little doubt
that power and wealth are being increasingly concentrated in the hands of
transnational corporations. This enables them to exercise inordinate influ-
ence, not only in small countries but also in relatively large countries such
8. See generally Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, "Tomorrow's Law Schools: Globalization and Legal
Education" (1995) 32 San Diego L. Rev. 137 at 151; Jonathan Story, "The Emerging World Finan-
cial Order and Different Forms of Capitalism" in Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, eds.,
2nd ed., Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
2000) 129 at 138.
9. See generally Stephen Gill, "Knowledge, Politics and the Neo-Liberal Political Economy" in
Stubbs & Underhill, ibid. 48 at 54-57 and Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social
Reform (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995).
10. Stephen McBride, Paradigm Shift: Globalization and the Canadian State (Halifax: Fernwood
Press, 2001) at 21; James H. Mittelman, "The Dynamics of Globalization", in Globalization: Criti-
cal Reflections, ed., James H. Mittelman (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1996) 1 at 3; Robert W.
Cox, "Political Economy and World Order: Problems of Power and Knowledge at the Turn of the
Millennium" in Stubbs & Underhill, supra note 8 at 25-26; Teeple, supra note 9.
11. McBride, ibid. at 13, 17; Claire Turenne Sjolander, "The Rhetoric of Globalization: What's in a
Wor[lI]d?" (1996) 51 International Journal 603 at 606-607; WH. Arthurs, "Globalization of the Mind:
Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal Fields" (1997) 12 C.J.L.S. 219 at 221 [Arthurs,
"Globalization"]; Mike Burke, Colin Mooers, & John Shields, eds., Restructuring and Resistance:
Canadian Public Policy in an Age of Global Capitalism (Halifax: Fernwood, 2000) at 20.
12. Sjolander, ibid. at 607.
13. Burke, Mooers & Shields, supra note 11 at 12; Mitchell Bernard, "Post Fordism and Global
Restructuring" in Stubbs & Underhill, supra note 8 at 152 at 158.
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as Canada. Second, although there is unanimity among commentators that
the new economy has serious consequences for the nation state, there is
widespread disagreement as to what those consequences will be. My own view
is to agree with those commentators who suggest that new economy
signals the end of the Keynesian welfare state with its emphasis on
economic stability and social security, 4 and a renewed faith in the capacity of
the market. But I do not go as far as to suggest that this means the end of the
state and a total slide into untrammelled neoliberal non-interventionism."
Rather, following Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin, I would suggest
that Canada is currently emerging as a "social investment state," a form
of government which emphasizes the pursuit of competitiveness,
employability and prosperity. 6 There are several political characteristics
central to this social investment state. First, the market and politics are not
contrasting principles of social organization. The market has no
pre-ordained natural essence independent of political processes; rather, the
market is a dynamic social phenomenon constructed by varying social
forces. Markets can and do vary over space and time to respond and give
effect to the prevailing powers at any particular moment in history. 7 As
Mittelman has noted, "the question is not whether the state should inter-
vene in the economy but what type of state and what interventions are
most appropriate in a specific context?"'8 For example, contemporary gov-
ernments are becoming increasingly responsive to non-citizens such as
transnational corporations, foreign currency traders and international
banks. 9 Second, the state might shrink, it may retreat from some of its
previous functions, and in some dimensions it may be hollowed out,2" but
the Canadian state is neither withering away nor becoming obsolete; rather
it is in a process of metamorphosis. The role of the state is now conceptu-
alized as "enabling ... facilitative and directive"'" so that "policies are
14. Burke, Mooers & Shields, ibid. at 10; McBride, supra note 10 at 79, 90.
15. Teeple, supra note 9.
16. Alexandra Dobrowolsky & Denis Saint-Martin, "Agency, Actors and Change in a Child Fo-
cused Future: Problematizing Path Dependency's Post and Statist Parameters" [forthcoming] at 2.
They build on an idea first articulated by Anthony Giddens in The Third Way: Renewal of Democ-
racy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
17. Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, "Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order" in Stubbs & Underhill,
supra note 8 at 3-4.
18. Mittelman, supra note 10 at 16; Arthurs, "Globalization", supra note 11 at 221.
19. Marjorie Griffin Cohen, "From the Welfare State to Vampire Capitalism" in Patricia M. Evans
& Gerda R. Wekerle, eds., Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1997) 28 at 41-42; Mittelman, supra note 10 at 9.
20. Bob Jessop, "Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on a Post-Fordist
Political Economy" (1993) 40 Studies in Political Economy 7 at 9.
21. Alexandra Dobrowolsky, "Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Figure of the Child and New Labour's
Strategic 'Social Investment State"' (2002) 69 Studies in Political Economy 43.
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developed in ways that project future outcomes in light of their productive
potential: the choices being made now bank on benefits to be reaped later
on."'22 Consequently, the social investment state, though fiscally respon-
sible, is active; the state engages in spending, but the spending is calcu-
lated to be strategic, sound and costed investments in education, training
and knowledge. 23 The state will seek to foster "adaptability and flexibility
in order to enable its citizens to compete effectively in a global market-
place 24 and it is willing to invest in "the improvement of the stock of
human capital... [if it will give it] a comparative advantage for the
economy. '25 Third, and importantly, as Dobrowolsky and St. Martin state:
The social investment state also promotes public-private relationships. It
does not simply revert to laissez fairism and a belief in the market. Rather
... the state engages in both neo-statist, and neo-corporatist behaviour, as
there is a continuing role for the state, but it also relies on ... an array of
complex 'partnerships' that include the voluntary sector.26
As a result, the social investment state does leave some space for the par-
ticipation of civil society, especially through public/private partnerships
and the "third sector" where there can be active agency and proactive
engagement and even contestation.
27
Beyond the foregoing economic and political dimensions, the new
economy also has significant social characteristics. As a result of the chang-
ing economic and political environment, the social fabric of Canadian
society is also undergoing significant transformation. Most importantly,
because of governments' commitment to deficit reduction, financial
stringency, balancing the budget, restructuring, retrenchment, deregula-
tion, decentralization and downloading, there has been a significant retreat
from the Keynesian social safety net. As a result, governmental support
for access to justice has diminished significantly. As we shall see later,
because legal aid has little direct impact on the ideology of investment, it
has suffered disproportionately from government cutbacks. Moreover, fac-
tors such as the downsizing of government, privatization, contracting out,
reorganization of the unemployment benefits system, shifts in the tax struc-
ture, the deregulation of labour markets and the creation of the Canada
Health and Social Transfer (C.H.S.T.) have radically increased income
22. Dobrowolsky & Saint-Martin, supra note 16 at 6.
23. Ibid. at 7; Dobrowolsky, supra note 21 at 44, 50.
24. McBride, supra note 10 at 23.
25. Burke, Mooers & Shields, supra note 11 at 18.
26. Dobrowolsky & Saint-Martin, supra note 16 at 8.
27. Ibid. at 16, 23; Dobrowolsky, supra note 21 at 58.
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inequality in Canada. 8 One report indicates that 60% of families experi-
enced an after tax real income decline in the 1990s. 29 Another indicates
that 57% of female headed households live in poverty, and that 21% of
children under the age of eighteen live in poverty, up from 15% in 1980.30
Finally, the cultural aspects of the new economy may not be quite as
obvious as some of its other dimensions. Several commentators have
pointed out that there may be an important cultural tension at play.3 On
the one hand, there is a tendency towards homogenization and uniformity,
exemplified by the diffusion of fungible consumer goods or product/
format standardization. On the other hand, globalization leads to greater
interaction among different cultures and cultural pluralism. In the Cana-
dian context, the interaction manifests itself in the increasing diversity of
the Canadian population. Given low birth rates, Canada has had to recruit
immigrants, many from the "Third World," in order to sustain a productive
and competitive workforce.32 However, visible minorities and Aboriginal
peoples tend to earn less than other Canadians.33 Consequently, diversity
intersects with economic inequality and poverty is racialized.3 4 Finally,
some commentators suggest that the polarizations generated by the new
economy are likely to intensify social conflict locally, nationally, region-
ally and internationally. 5
Each of these dimensions of the new economy - the economic, politi-
cal, social and cultural - has a direct impact upon the Canadian legal
profession. Indeed, several commentators have argued that we are experi-
encing a change in the "mode of production of law."
'36
Economically, lawyers have spearheaded the development of the new
28. McBride, supra note 10 at 79-101.
29. Ibid. at 93.
30. Ellen M. Gee, "Demographic Change in Canadian Society - Looking to 2020" in WA. Bogart,
ed., Access to Affordable and Appropriate Law Related Services in 2020 (Report of a Roundtable
sponsored by the Department of Justice, the Law Commission of Canada, the Canadian Bar Associa-
tion and the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor) (Ottawa: CBA, January 1999) 31 at 37 [Access],
online: CBA Reports <http:www.cba.org/cba/cba-reports/main/>.
31. Mittelman, supra note 10 at 2, 8; Sjolander, supra note 11 at 604, 609.
32. Gee, supra note 30 at 31-34.
33. Ibid. at 35.
34 The UN Special Session on Children, Putting Promises into Action: A Report on a Decade of
Child and Family Poverty in Canada (Toronto" Campaign 2000,2003) at 10, online: Campaign 2000
< http://www.campaign2000.ca/rc/unsscMAY02/MAY02statusreport.pdf> .
35. Mittelman, supra note 10 at 18; Sjolander, supra note 11 at 609.
36. David M. Trubek et al., "Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization
of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas" (1994) 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 407 at
419; Harry W. Arthurs & Robert Kreklewich, "Law, Legal Institutions and the Legal Profession in
the New Economy" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. I at 16; Harry W. Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal
Education: So Near to Wall Street, So Far from God" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 381 at 386 [Arthurs,
"Legal Education"].
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economy. 7 As Keith Clark, Chairman [sic] of Clifford Chance - the
world's second biggest law firm - has said "[w]here businessmen [sic]
and bankers go, lawyers are not far behind and often get there first."'38 For
several decades now lawyers have been engaged in the project of develop-
ing "the new property," with a heavy emphasis on intellectual property
rights. Moreover, intellectual property is widely perceived to be one of the
most important growth areas for legal practice, for it requires the "creation
of a new category of juridical technicians".39 For example, scientific
developments must be commodified to be exploited, and commodification
requires the conversion of abstract ideas, processes and systems into
private property rights. Intellectual property rights are now being used to
protect a company's proprietary interests in the human genome, the bio-
logical components of traditional natural remedies, and other developments
on the new frontiers of intellectual property law.
Similarly, lawyers have played a central role in the globalization of the
economy. Whether we are discussing the emergence of global capital mar-
kets or globalized firms, lawyers have been key actors in constructing such
regimes and assisting their clients in participating in such fora.4" Arthurs
and Kreklewich suggest that we are witnessing the emergence of a new lex
mercatoria, in which "law experts are central to the production of ... non-
state regimes.'"41
37. Richard G. Stock & Lori Brazier, "Corporate Counsel and the Corridors of Power" Lexpert:
The Business Magazine for Lawyers (April 2002) 64; Michael Lewis, "Surviving the Tech Wreck"
Canadian Lawyer 26:10 (October 2002) 10 at 10.
38. Keith Clark, "Introduction" in Basil Markesinis, ed., The Clifford Chance Millennium Lectures: The
Coming Together of the Common Law and the Civil Law (Oxford: Hart, 2000) 1 at 4. Clark pointed out
that Clifford Chance believes, "In this new world, respect for different legal cultures ... will be key" (ibid.
at 7). However, he also states, "We seek to use the best forms of practice in each legal system, and
combine them on a daily basis ..." (ibid. at 3). Clark's paper illustrates the tensions between a commercial
imperative that believes that "the standardisation of such transactions drives down their costs" (ibid. at 5)
and the global political imperative that clings to cultural differences in law.
Harry Arthurs, analysing the same phenomenon, but through a very different ideological lens,
noted that:
It is not surprising to find that some law students, lawyers, law firms, and law faculties
are attempting to position themselves to take best advantage of continentalism and glo-
balization. This takes several forms: the acquisition of capacities and credentials which
will be negotiable in an integrated continental legal community; the development of repu-
tations which will have transborder currency; and the forging of transnational alliances
and partnerships which will enable Canadians to survive and flourish in the new conti-
nental dispensation. In the short term, moreover, legal actors are staking out their claims
as managers of continental integration, as stalwarts of the resistance movement or as
honest brokers between the two.
(Arthurs, "Legal Education", supra note 36 at 387.)
39. Arthurs & Kreklewich, supra note 36 at 16.
40. "Low Dollar, IT help fuel export of legal services" Lawyers Weekly 22:14 (16 August 2002) 22.
41. Arthurs & Kreklewich, supra note 36 at 38; see also Arthurs, "Globalization", supra note 11 at
221, 237; Arthurs, "Legal Education", supra note 36 at 403-404.
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Legal knowledge is a highly valuable form of knowledge in the new
economy. First year lawyers in some of the elite Bay Street firms begin
their careers earning nearly $100,000 a year.42 In response to globalized
market forces, law schools are under increasing pressure to provide
students with the type of education that will enable them to contribute to
the marketplace. My own law school, Dalhousie University, has recently
created a Law and Technology Institute.43
Similarly, commentators argue that as a result of globalization the prac-
tice of international law will expand greatly, especially in the realm of
international contracts, foreign investment, international banking, antitrust,
arbitration, tax planning and commercial trade.44 Further, as globalized
players seek to determine which legal regimes are most hospitable for
investment and encourage the cross-fertilization, standardization and
convergence of different legal systems, 45 the area of comparative law will
expand.
Finally, governments contract out legal work to the private bar.
Although it has been difficult to obtain solid information on the exact
dollar figures of legal services that are being contracted out,4 6 one source
indicates that spending on services by the federal government has increased
from approximately $38 million in 1994-1995 to $46 million in 1999-2000
and $57 million in 2001-2002. 47 Another source indicates that the federal
spending increased from approximately $42 million in 1998-1999 to $51
million in 1999-2000, $55 million in 2000-2001, $63 million in 2001-2002
and $65 million in 2002-2003. 41 Of the $65 million spent in 2002-2003,
42 See online: ZSA <httpd.Iwwwzsa caEnInfor/showtnfophpfile=/En/InfolPages/ontario.inc>
43. See online: Dalhousie University Law and Technology Institute <http://asOl.ucis.dal.ca/law/lati/>.
44. Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 8 at 139.
45. Ibid. at 149, 155; Clark, supra note 38 at 4-5; Trubek et al., supra note 36 at 428, 475, 497-498.
46. At the federal level, figures were available through the Department of Justice and the Depart-
ment of Finance. However, at the provincial level, most of the departments would not provide the
information services because of provincial privacy laws. As well, most of the provincial CBA and
Law Society offices did not maintain statistics on contracting out. Nevertheless, information about
contracting out is available in Nova Scotia. It has been suggested that in Nova Scotia there has been
a decline in contracting out in recent years. In 2001-2002 it is estimated that $5.3 million was spent
on legal services, but that this will be reduced to less than $4 million in 2002-2003 (data provided by
the Nova Scotia Department of Justice on 25 November 2002). One proffered explanation for con-
tracting out is that in-house legal counsel lack expertise in specialized areas of the law. As I dis-
cussed earlier, the new economy has resulted in the shrinking or hollowing out of the state. This has
implications for the role of in-house governmental lawyers whose capacities may be reduced be-
cause of structural pressure on organisations. The perceived benefits of competition with external
lawyers and the provision of legal advice that may be regarded as more independent and less suscep-
tible to agency capture than that provided by in-house governmental lawyers may also contribute to
the hollowing out of institutional capacity.
47. Data provided by the Federal Department of Justice, Ottawa (Correspondence with the Federal
Department of Justice, 9 January 2003).
48 Cristin Schmitz, "Federal Crown Agents billings reached a record $65 million" Lawyers Weekly
23:6 (6 June 2003) 1.
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$24 million was for non-criminal matters and $22.5 million for the war
on drugs.
49
Politically, lawyers have also played a leadership role. As a result of
the closer relationship between states and transnational corporations, some
lawyers - particularly commercial lawyers, but also constitutional law-
yers - are playing an important role as intermediaries between govern-
ments, banks and businesses. They communicate business' wants to
governments as governments develop policies.50 NAFTA, for example, has
been described as a "product of the trade bar."''" Indeed, some have argued
that "powerful supranational corporations are relatively free to produce
their own law, their own normative systems, and to impose them on cus-
tomers, suppliers, workers - even on governments."52
Finally, socially and culturally the new economy has had an impact
upon the legal profession. For example, I have suggested that law firms
have benefited from government policies of contracting out legal services,
which have enabled these private firms to profit from taxpayers' money.
Moreover, while the state may have less need for certain legal skills, other
types of legal expertise are in greater demand. It has been argued that the
"juridification of welfare, refugee admissions, and prison administration
... have all resulted in the expansion of the cadre of law experts employed
by the state or by advocacy groups ..."" Examples of some of these groups
include the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), the Afri-
can Canadian Legal Clinic, and the Refugee Law Office.
None of this is to argue that the new economy has been unqualifiedly
good for the legal profession.54 As Katzmann has summarized, in recent
years the profession has become increasingly strained on several levels:
the growth of larger firms, the rise in costs with its impetus towards inten-
sifying the need to log an ever-increasing number of billable hours, the
fickle loyalties of clients - and lawyers - to firms; the erosion of colle-
giality, and the specialization and commercialization of lawyers.5 Some
of this is due, in part, to the nature of the new economy, More specifically,
there has been an increase in stratification within the Canadian legal
profession, with the elite large firms getting bigger and doing increasingly
well, middle sized firms struggling to maintain market share, and smaller
49. Ibid.; Cristin Schmitz "Lumber War, aboriginal suit triggers big Crown agent tabs" Lawyers
Weekly 23:8 (20 June 2003) 1.
50. Clark, supra note 38.
51. Trubek et al., supra note 36 at 469.
52. Arthurs & Kreklewich, supra note 36 at 22.
53. Ibid. at 37.
54. See Arthurs, "Legal Education", supra note 36 at 397-401.
55. See Robert A. Katzmann, "Themes in Context" in Robert A. Katzmann, ed., The Law Firm and
the Public Good (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1995) 1 at 4-5.
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firms facing hard times.56 The number of lawyers employed by govern-
ment also has been cut as a result of governmental downsizing. 7 More-
over, although the legal profession itself is becoming more diversified,
there are suggestions of a correlation between gender and race on the one
hand and economic status on the other.58
In the next section, I will demonstrate how these developments are
affecting access to justice in Canada through provision of legal aid
services. This will lay the foundation for an assessment of the legal profession's
response to what is widely perceived to be a "crisis" in access to justice.
II. Access To Justice And Legal Aid
"Access to justice", like the "new economy", is a highly indeterminate
idea and ideal.59 Much depends upon whether one puts the emphasis on
"access" or on "justice."60 Clearly, however, it is a large idea that seeks to
live up to the promises of a democratic society committed to both the rule
of law and the principle of equality. There is little doubt that access to
justice must mean more than access to a lawyer,6' but given the pervasive-
ness and complexity of both substantive and procedural law in contempo-
rary Canadian society, it would seem that access to a lawyer is a necessary
- though insufficient - element of access to justice.62 Lawyers, in other
words, function as the gatekeepers of the justice system.
63
56. See generally Arthurs & Kreklewich, supra note 36 at 44-47; Arthurs, "Globalization" supra
note 11 at 237-238, 244.
57. See Arthurs, "Legal Education", supra note 36 at 397.
58. See e.g. CBA Report of the Working Group on Racial Equality in the Legal Profession, The Chal-
lenge ofRacial Equality: Putting Principles into Practice (CBA: Ottawa, 1999) at 18: "While lawyers
from racialized communities may find employment, their careers may get stalled as they do not earn
the same salaries or progress at the same rate or to the same levels as their white colleagues."
59. William E. Conklin, "Whither Justice: The Common Problematic of Five Models of Access to
Justice" (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 297.
60. See Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access to Justice and Law Reform # 2" (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 317 at 323.
61. Indeed it can be argued that in some respects lawyers may be part of the problem. See e.g.
Yedida Zalik, "Where There is No Lawyer: Developing Legal Services for Street Youth" (2000) 18
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 153.
62. Although courts have not constitutionalized a right to legal representation, they have clearly
recognized the importance of being able to access a lawyer in so far as they have acknowledged the
inherent jurisdiction of a court to order the government to provide legal representation in certain
situations. See e.g. R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) I (Ont. C.A); New Brunswick (Minister
of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.) (1999) 26 C.R. (5th) 203 (S.C.C.). See also B.(G.D.) v.
The Queen, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520, where the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the right
to effective assistance of counsel is a principle of justice (ibid. at paras. 24-25).
63. See David Harris, "Meet Legal Needs of the Poor Through Organization, Not Mandatory Pro
Bono" (2001) 163 New Jersey Law Journal 23, online: Lowenstein Sandier: Attorneys at Law <http:/
/www.lowenstein.com/new/meetlegal.html> [Harris, "Organization"].
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Proponents of the Keynesian welfare state recognized the importance
of being able to access a lawyer through the creation of legal aid
programmes as a key component of access to justice.' The CBA, in a
recent publication, has articulated the following, explicitly welfarist, "state-
ment of principle":
The objective of an effective and fair legal aid system is to provide and
encourage equal access for all Canadians to the full range of essential
legal services, of a consistently high quality through a plan adequately
funded by federal and provincial governments and assured of indepen-
dence in promoting the legal welfare of individuals who are unable to
afford legal counsel.65
Such a principle is reflective of a broader public consciousness which
has emerged over the last fifty years. Legal aid has come to epitomize the
institutional and financial embodiment of access to justice.66 Consequently,
for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on legal aid to reflect upon the
impact of the new economy and its significance for the ethical obligations
of the legal profession.
Legal aid was first introduced in the United Kingdom in 1949 as part of the
newly emerging welfare state. Ontario became the first Canadian province to
legislate a legal aid plan in 1967, with the other provinces and territories fol-
lowing suit over the next fifteen years. From the beginning, advocates of legal
aid recognized that inequality can manifest itself in both the public and private
sphere.67 Consequently, legal aid was available not only for criminal law mat-
ters, but also for civil law matters such as family law, divorce, separation,
maintenance, custody, access and child protection, and (in some jurisdictions)
welfare, refugee, and mental health issues.
Because Canada is a federal system, legal aid was unevenly structured
and distributed among the provinces. In every jurisdiction, the federal gov-
ernment provided targeted funding for civil and criminal legal aid under
64. See e.g. Rebecca Johnstone & Jennifer Thomas, "Legal Aid in Canada: 1996-1997" (1998)
18:10 Juristat: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics 1.
65. As quoted in Melina Buckley, The Legal Aid Crisis: Time For Action (Background paper pre-
pared for the CBA, 2000) at 2; Daphne Dumont, "A Commitment to Win Access to Justice for All:
The CBA's Efforts to Improve Civil Legal Aid Services in Canada" in The Civil LegalAid Confer-
ence (Toronto: LEAF, 2002) 1 at 2 [LEAF].
66. National Council of Welfare, Legal Aidfor the Poor (Minister of Human Resources Develop-
ment Canada, 1995), online: National Council of Welfare <http://www.ncwcnbes.net/htmdocument/
reportlegalaid/reportlegalaid.htm> [LegalAid for the Poor].
67. See generally ibid. and Legal Aid Ontario, Legal Civil Tariff Reform: Business Case (Novem-
ber 2001) at 6-9, online: Legal Aid Ontario <http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/info/pdf/
Tariff BusinessCase-full-document.pdf> [Legal Aid Tariff Reform].
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the Canada Assistance Plan (C.A.P.). The provinces also contributed. For
example, in Ontario, the federal government funded approximately 20%
of the programme and the province the rest.68 The programmes were de-
signed and administered by the provinces and territories. The result was a
checker-board system where geographical location determined the scope
of coverage.6' Despite the obvious inequities of such a system, the basic
pattern across the country between the 1960s and the early 1990s was one
of continuous growth.7"
Two constituencies benefited from such programmes: low income
Canadians who were recipients of legal advice, and the legal profession
itself.7 For example, it has been estimated that of the $465.1 million spent
on direct legal services in 1996-97, 68% was paid to private lawyers. 72 The
authors of the study also note that, in the same year, of the 67,038 regis-
tered practicing lawyers in Canada approximately 24% provided legal aid
assistance.
7 3
All this began to change in the mid 1990s with the retrenchment of the
state from welfare driven programmes.74 In 1991-1992, the federal govern-
ment capped its criminal legal aid contribution at the 1989-1990 level of
$86 million. By 2001-2002, this amount had dropped to just under $80
million. Currently, criminal legal aid is generally available only where an
accused faces the possibility of incarceration.7" On the civil side, the turn-
ing point was 1994-1995, when the C.A.P. was replaced by the C.H.S.T. and
legal aid monies became part of an unconditional transfer to the provinces,
with the federal government no longer directly contributing to civil legal
68. John D. McCamus, "The Reshaping of Legal Aid" in Access, supra note 30 at 43, where he
states that the remainder of the funding for legal aid comes from a share of the interest on lawyers'
trust funds administered by the Law Foundation of Ontario, contributions from members of the
profession through a hold-back on legal aid fees, a levy imposed on the profession and client contri-
butions. (The professional levy has since been abolished in Ontario).
69. See Buckley, supra note 65 at 33-34.
70. LegalAidfor the Poor, supra note 66 at 11: "When we adjust per capita expenditures on legal
aid to eliminate the effect of inflation, we see that expenditures grew tremendously from the begin-
ning of legal aid in the early 1970s until the end of that decade, then slowed down rising by only 30%
between 1978-1979 and 1986-1987... Spending took off again in the following years, rising by 175%
in actual dollars and doubling in uninflated dollars between 1980-1987 and 1992-1993."
71. Ibid. at 20-25.
72. Johnstone & Thomas, supra note 64.
73. Ibid.
74. Similar cutbacks have taken place in many other countries. See e.g. Don Fleming, "Australian
Legal Aid under the First Howard Government" (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 343; Roger Smith, "Clin-
ics in a Cold Climate: Community Law Centres in England and Wales" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J.
895; Francis Regan, "Legal Aid Without the State: Assessing the Rise of Pro Bono Schemes" (2000)
33 U.B.C. L.Rev. 383.
75. See Buckley,"supra note 65 at 13.
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aid.76 In other words, federal contributions went into the general revenues
of the provinces and ceased to be targeted to legal aid. As the following
table demonstrates, while justice spending for the coercive dimensions of
the state increased in the late 1990s, legal aid was the only expenditure
that clearly dropped:
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99
$ million
Justice Spending1  9,944.0 9,966.0 9,996.0 9,011.0 10,704.0
Police2  5,783.7 5,808.6 5,856.1 5,989.0 6,209.8
Courts 838.0 848.0 857.4 x 925.0
Prosecutions 257.0 261.0 264.6 x 278.0
Legal Aid 646.0 622.9 536.1 454.6 494.0
YouthCorrections3  526.0 507.2 501.4 490.2 497.4
AdultCorrections 1,894.0 1,918.9 1,968.6 2,077.4 2,257.0
x Data not available, applicable or confidential.
1. In order to allow annual comparisons, court expenditures for 1993-1994, and 1995-1996 are estimated, based on the
average between the reporting years immediately preceding and following the reference period. Prosecutions expendi-
tures for 1995-1996 were estimated in similar manner. Note that these estimates are included the total. Prosecutions
expenditures for 1992-1993 and 1993-1994 are not included in the total.
2. Most municipal police forces report on a calendar year, all other data represent fiscal year reporting.
3. Youth corrections costs are estimates. The figures likely underestimate total costs.
Source: Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 8502lI Last modified: March 7, 2001
The extent of the down sizing may be illustrated by reference to Ontario
and British Columbia. In Ontario, "the principal device for reducing
expenditures was simply to eliminate service in various areas" so that
certificates issued for legal aid dropped from 230,000 to 80,000 per year,
with the most serious impact in the family law area.7 The government also
imposed a strict cap on legal aid funding for each fiscal year. 8 Because of
frozen tariffs, in 2002 the private bar held a "job action" week and threat-
ened a legal aid "strike".79
76. LegalAid and the Poor, supra 66 at 9.
77. McCamus, supra note 68 at 44-45.
78. Ibid. at 43.
79. Cristin Schmitz, "Weeklong Protest in Ottawa Planned Over Legal Aid Tarriff", Lawyers Weekly
21:42 (15 March 2002) 1 at 1.
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In British Columbia, in 2002, the new Liberal government cut legal aid
by almost 40% and announced the closure of twenty-four courthouses.
The stated goal was to cut funding from $88.3 million in 2001-2002 to $54
million in 2004-2005. This led to an unprecedented chain of events: objec-
tions from the legal aid board and its ultimate firing by the Attorney
General, a no confidence motion in the Attorney General being passed by
an overwhelming majority of the British Columbia Law Society (by a vote
of 754-325), a letter from the chief judge of the Provincial Court to the
Attorney General indicating that the judiciary had lost confidence in him,
and a suit by the Law Society seeking an injunction against the Attorney
General.80 The Attorney General defended himself in the familiar discourses
of neo-liberal necessitarianism: although he "expressed regret" at the "real
impact" of the cuts, "these are tough times" and he "had no choice".81
The problem of there being less funding for legal aid is compounded
by other cutbacks, restructuring and increased coercion by the state.
Consequently, a greater number of people have found themselves worse
off and, therefore, the demand for legal aid has increased. McCamus notes
that in Ontario over a six-year period:
The welfare rolls in Ontario had increased by about 40%. The number of
violent offence charges had risen about 16%. The number of family law
cases had almost doubled over that period of time. Changes to existing
law and prosecutorial policy no doubt had an impact. Due process
requirements had made immigration and refugee law more complex. Crimi-
nal law cases appeared to have increasing complexity, principally as a
result of the Charter. Minimum sentence and zero tolerance policies of
various kinds made some types of cases harder to clear. Family law also
enjoyed some growth in complexity. As well, government involvement in
family law matters for example forcing single mothers to seek support as
a condition of receiving welfare added to case volumes.82
Johnstone and Thomas have summarized the national profile of legal
aid as follows: applications for legal aid peaked in the early 1990s, but
declined significantly thereafter because of application fees, pre-screen-
ing procedures, restrictions in coverage, tightened eligibility criteria and
reduced government funding.
83
80. See Jean Sorensen, "Cutting B.C. Legal Aid System in Half" Canadian Lawyer (26:8) (August
2002) 17; Gary Oakes, "B.C. Attorney General, Judges Declare Ceasefire on Closures" Lawyers
Weekly (22:1) (3 May 2002) 2; Michael Wilhelmson & Gary Oakes, "Law Society of B.C. Chal-
lenges Plans to Close 24 Courthouses" Lawyers Weekly (21:44) (29 March 2002) 1.
81. Gary Oakes, "Law Society of B.C., CBA Denounce Government's Firing of Legal Aid Board"
Lawyers Weekly (21:41) (8 March 2002) 1 at 2.
82. McCamus, supra note 68 at 43-44; LegalAid Tariff Reform, supra note 67 at 9, 14-19.
83. Johnstone & Thomas, supra note 64.
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The effects of such governmental cutbacks have an especially harsh
impact upon those who may need legal services the most: the poor, women,
members of "visible minority groups", persons with disabilities, the home-
less, and First Nations. 84 As the National Council for Welfare has observed,
"poverty law" issues such as landlord/tenant relations, consumer fraud,
social assistance, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation,
disability benefits and pension programmes can be especially problematic
because of the complexity of the regulatory regimes and the nature of the
bureaucracies involved.85 A particularly interesting issue, in the light of
globalization, is the issue of legal aid for immigration and refugee claim-
ants. The Attorney General of Ontario has suggested that the federal
government's increased tightening of admission criteria has led to a sig-
nificant increase in legal aid costs from $14 million in 2001 to $20 million
in 2002 and estimates as high as $43 million in 2003.86
Finally, it is important to note that it is not just legal aid lawyers or left
oriented advocates who have expressed concern about access to justice.
Judges have also become increasingly alarmed in recent years with the
large number of unrepresented or self-represented litigants appearing in
court. Over the last several years, there have been a number of judicial
conferences on how to respond to such litigants and attempts have been
made to develop protocols and procedures.87 In one court in Toronto 75%
of the parties appearing in family law matters were not represented by a
lawyer.88 In short, as the British Columbia Coalition on Access to Justice
has pointed out:
Legal aid underfunding has resulted in a tiered system ofjustice, with at
least three types of people who need lawyers. First, there are those who
can pay for lawyers privately. Second, there are those who receive Legal
Aid from lawyers who receive unrealistically low remuneration for the
work and time required to provide the high quality level of representa-
tion each client deserves. Third, there are those who are refused the ser-
vices of a lawyer altogether, since they do not qualify financially or they
have a legal issue which is not covered by the tariff.89
84. See generally Buckley, supra note 65 at 3, 40-44; Hill, supra note 1 at 2, 41; LEAF, supra note
65; LegalAid Tariff Reform, supra note 66 at 32; Zalik, supra note 61 at 164-165, 176; Sorenson,
supra note 80 at 21.
85. LegalAidfor the Poor, supra 66 at 6, 23-24, 29.
86. John Jaffey, "Access System's 'Foremost Challenge': A.G." Lawyers Weekly (21:34) (18 Janu-
ary 2002) 3. See also Sorensen, supra note 80 at 21.
87. See e.g. Beyond Accommodation to Equality in the Courtroom - Gatekeepers, Advocates or
Referees? New Brunswick Court of Queen "s Bench and Court of Appeal Education Seminar Held
June 26-27, 2002 [unpublished, copy on file with the author].
88. See Buckley, supra note 65 at 45.
89. Ibid. at 16.
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Thus, to summarize my argument so far, it would seem that the effect
of the new economy on the legal profession has been Janus-faced: because
of its potential to expand the market for legal services it may tie the legal
profession even more closely to those who are privileged; but for these
very same reasons, it may actively disconnect increasing numbers of law-
yers from those in society who might need their help the most.90 The next
section analyzes how the Canadian legal profession has responded to this
dilemma, and then considers an alternative possibility, mandatory pro bono.
III. The Ethical Obligations Of The Legal Profession
1. Caveat
In the same way that there are analytical problems with the new economy and
access to justice, there are also analytical problems with the phenomenon we
call the legal profession. As Kent Roach has noted, "[i]t is misleading to talk of
a legal profession which includes barristers and solicitors, local, national and
international firms, boutique and generalist firms, sole practitioners and
lawyer employees. The legal profession is fragmented and stratified." '1 More
specifically, in the context of this paper, it is important to note that there are
sharp divisions in the legal profession between those who have been doing
increasingly well over the last decade (in part perhaps due to the new economy)
and those who have been struggling. This is perhaps best personified in the
priorities of the two past presidents of the CBA (Daphne Dumont, family law-
yer from PEI, and Eric Rice, a general practice lawyer from Richmond B.C.),
both of whom made legal aid an explicit priority, and the new president (Simon
Potter, a corporate lawyer from Montreal) whose emphasis is on international
trade law and globalization.92
Clearly, some lawyers have been negatively affected by the cuts to
legal aid.93 Tariffs for legal aid work have been frozen for a decade, and
there is little doubt that many lawyers who do legal aid work put in more
time than they are paid for and carry an extremely high caseload. 94 Indeed,
the CBA notes in passing that "[t]he caseload of Nova Scotia [legal aid]
staff lawyers is similarly about four times that of the busiest lawyers in
private practice in that province." '95 Significant numbers of lawyers have
90. See Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 8 at 139.
91. K. Roach, "Restructuring of the Legal Profession" in Access, supra note 30 at 78.
92. Alex Dickson, "New CBA President, Simon V Potter", Canadian Lawyer (26:8) (August 2002)
27 at 27.
93. See e.g. Legal Aid Tariff Reform, supra note 67.
94. Buckley, supra note 65 at 55-68.
95. Buckley, ibid at 65.
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withdrawn from providing legal aid services.96 In Ontario, for example, it
has been estimated that since "the legal aid cutbacks in 1996, about 24% of
private lawyers have stopped doing legal aid cases".
97
Despite this caveat, it is still possible to discern the contours of the
overall response by the legal profession to the problem of access to justice.
2. The Response of the Legal Profession
The legal profession tends to make much of its contributions in facilitating
access to justice. Official reports from the CBA highlight the following:
" direct contributions through financial levies; 9
" the amount of funding generated by interest on trust accounts;
" the extent to which bills for legal services are voluntarily discounted
for compassionate reasons;
" pro bono contribution of legal services; and
" volunteer participation of members of the legal profession in
governance and/or operation of the legal aid organization.99
The CBA has lobbied to maintain and enhance legal aid budgets; it has
launched Legal Aid Watch to collect "horror stories"; it has engaged in
public education programmes; it has commissioned legal opinions in sup-
port of publicly funded legal representation in Canada 00 and it has
proposed investigation of some alternative funding schemes (e.g., pre-paid
legal services plans, contingency legal aid funds, contingency fees and tax
deductions for legal expenses).' Even more dramatically, some lawyers
have engaged in "job actions" and legal aid boycotts, 0 2 while others have
96. See especially ibid. at 38; Cristin Schmitz, "Week Long Protest in Ottawa Planned Over Legal
Aid Tarriff" Lawyers Weekly (21:42) (15 March 2002) 1 at 22; donalee Moulton, "More N.S. Law-
yers Seen Refusing Legal Aid Cases" Lawyers Weekly (21:46) (12 April 2002) 6.
97. Cristin Schmitz, "Private Bar Legal Aid 'Strike' Looms in Ontario Over Rates" Lawyers Weekly
22:11 (12 July 2002) 3.
98. But note that in 1996-1997 it is estimated that legal profession contributions equalled only 2%
of revenue for legal aid assistance. See Johnstone & Thomas, supra note 64.
99. Buckley, supra note 65 at 50; G. Schellenberg, "Action on Legal Aid" Voir Dire (July 2000) 1.
100. Dumont, supra note 65; CBA, Making the Case: The Right to Publicly Funded Legal Represen-
tation in Canada (Ottawa: CBA, 2002), online: CBA Reports <http://www.cba.org/cba/cba-reports/
main/>.
101. See Buckley, supra note 65 at 4, 82-87.
102. See generally Cristin Schmitz, "Week-long Protest in Ottawa Planned Over Legal Aid Tariff"
Lawyers Weekly 21:42 (15 March 2002) 1; Cristin Schmitz, "Ontario A.G., Defence Bar Reach Le-
gal Aid 'Understanding' Lawyers Weekly 22:25 (1 November 2002) 3; Dean Jobb, "Nova Scotia
Lawyers Considering Boycott of Legal Aid Work" Lawyers Weekly 22:31 (13 December 2002) 3.
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sought Fisher applications (i.e., requests by lawyers to judges for an order
that the province must pay counsel their reasonable hourly fees).103 More-
over, the CBA has decided to sue governments, claiming that it is unconsti-
tutional to deny legal aid. 1 4
Much of this is praiseworthy. But it has also produced little in the way
of results, as the CBA itself acknowledges.0 5 Moreover, the CBA has iden-
tified some of the problems in arguing for better legal aid: the provinces
manage the delivery of legal aid thereby making coordinated lobbying
difficult; legal aid does not have a public profile; the public often misun-
derstands why people need legal aid; and people have misconceptions about
why lawyers want improvements to the legal aid system.0 6
It is clear from the foregoing that the primary thrust of the CBA's agenda
has been to focus on the obligations of governments to provide for legal
aid funding. But the likelihood of governments fully responding to the
legal aid crisis in the new economy are extremely slim.,0 7 The legal profes-
sion needs to be more aware of the larger context of the retrenching new
economy, and more importantly, move in tandem with the emerging
discourses of the "social investment state." In particular, I want to suggest
that the legal profession should consider the possibility of promoting a
"third sector partnership" with governments to reconceptualize legal aid
not as a welfare entitlement, but as a social investment that will "enhance
efficiency" and "improve the human capital stock" of Canadian society.
The key to the creation of this partnership will be an offer by the profes-
sion to engage in mandatory pro bono, with consideration from the
government coming in the form of re-investment in legal aid.'0 The result
will be enhanced (although undoubtedly still inadequate) access to justice.
There already exists in Canada the inchoate elements of such a project.
103. See generally Cristin Schmitz, "'Fisher King' wins Two Key Legal Aid Funding Cases" Law-
yers Weekly 22:23 (18 October 2002) 9; Cristin Schmitz, "Trial Judges Order Crown to Pay Premi-
ums Above Current Legal Aid Rates" Lawyers Weekly 22:19 (20 September 2002) 1 at 18; Eric
Dowd, "Ontario A.G. Angered by Judges' Actions on Legal Aid Fees" Lawyers Weekly 22:20 (27
September 2002) 3. The Government of Ontario pays legal aid lawyers $88 per hour; the courts have
been ordering the government to pay between $125-140 per hour. See also, Jim Middlemiss, "Bar
Playing with Fisher Fire" Lawyers Weekly 22:24 (25 October 2002) 5.
104. See Cristin Schmitz, "CBA to Launch Series of Test Cases to Challenge Funding of Legal Aid"
Lawyers Weekly 22:15 (23 August 2002) 6.
105. See especially Dumont, supra note 65 at 6-7.
106.Ibid. at 8-10.
107. See also Rob Atkinson, "A Social Democratic Critique of the Pro Bono Publico Representation of
the Poor: The Good as the Enemy of the Best" (2001) 9 Am.U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 129 at 131.
108. Such a view may be beginning to emerge in British Columbia. See Gary Oakes "Now it's B.C.
Government's Turn, Says Head of New Pro Bono Body" Lawyers Weekly 22:3 (13 December 2002) 6.
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I suggest that now is an appropriate moment for the leadership of the legal
profession to pull these various strands together and to make an offer to
governments. Five disparate threads can be identified.
First, leaders of the profession have called for more voluntary pro
bono0 9 and in 1998 the CBA passed a resolution "committing the Associa-
tion to the development of a policy which requires or encourages each
member to contribute fifty hours or three percent of billings per year topro
bono work, aimed at assisting the disadvantaged."' 10 Nothing came of this,
and in 2001 a new working group was created to investigate further."'
Second, in both Ontario and British Columbia new voluntary pro bono
societies have been created. Their goal is to promote, coordinate and
facilitate the provision of pro bono services." 2 In British Columbia, the
109. Jaffey, supra note 86.
110. Hill, supra note 1 quoting McMurtry C.J.O. at 1.
111. Canadian Bar Association, CBA Resolution 01-15-A, online: Resolutions 2001 < http://
www.cba.org/cba/resolutions/2001 res/probono.asp>.
112. See e.g. Law Society of British Columbia and CBA (B.C. Branch), Pro Bono Publico Lawyers:
Serving the Public Good in B.C.: Report of the Pro Bono Initiative Committee June 2002 [B.C.
Report]. The Report further spells out its objectives as follows:
As part of its community development work, the Society will:
* operate as a first point of contact for community organizations looking forpro bono
assistance for their clients and for lawyers interested in pro bono;
* provide programme support to pro bono organizations and lawyers (it will not, how
ever, provide direct delivery of pro bono legal services);
* direct agencies, lawyers and, in some cases, individual clients to apro bono programme
most appropriate to them;
* function as a centralized source of information and other useful pro bono resource
materials;
* assist community organizations with developingpro bono delivery models and resource
materials to ensure consistent and high quality pro bono legal services;
* assist community organizations with publicizing their pro bono opportunities;
* develop and maintain a directory of pro bono programmes available in the province;
and
* coordinate the profession's pro bono programmes (ibid. at 17).
It is also worth noting, however, that the Report is quite explicit about what it describes as the
"public and government relations implications" of the initiative:
The public and government relations benefits of the proposedpro bono framework should
not be underestimated. Lawyers are often criticized for their apparent lack of commit-
ment to assisting people who need help the most, irrespective of whether the criticism is
warranted. Many lawyers are committed to public service and they demonstrate the com-
mitment by giving their time and resources to a variety of charitable organizations and
worth causes. Unfortunately, the public is not fully aware of the profession's philan-
thropic spirit. From a public relations perspective, the proposed framework forpro bono
would accomplish the following objectives:
* demonstrate to the public that lawyers can and do perform charitable work;
* debunk the myth that lawyers do not currently provide or never have provided pro bono
legal services;
* mobilize lawyers who are looking for new, meaningful ways to give back to the
community; and
* generate positive media coverage about lawyers' humanitarian activities, thus
improving the public image of lawyers (ibid. at 18).
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primary vehicle will be the adaptation of a website called "Pro Bono Net"
that will be "accessible to both lawyers seeking to do pro bono work and
community groups looking for free legal assistance.""' In Ontario, the
plan seems to be more inclusive, covering not only charities and commu-
nity groups but also "needy people themselves."' 14 Moreover, there is the
Western Canada Society to Access Justice, which operates thirty-two
clinics from Manitoba to British Columbia where "[m]ore than 230 law-
yers volunteer time once a month to help about 300 clients who can't
afford professional legal advice or are unable to obtain legal aid."'" 5
Similarly, in Nova Scotia nearly 150 lawyers volunteer with Reach, an
organization that seeks to provide legal counselling for persons with
disabilities.
11 6
Third, a recent survey of British Columbia lawyers found that 78%
claim to be delivering pro bono services.1 7 At first blush these initiatives
113. Michael Wilhelmson, "Go-ahead Given to Create B.C. Non-Profit Pro Bono Society" Lawyers
Weekly 21:47 (19 April 2002) 7.
114. Bill Rogers, "Profile: Ronald Manes" Lawyers Weekly 21:35 (25 January 2002) 8. See gener-
ally, Pro Bono News: Quarterly Newsletter of Pro Bono Law Ontario.
115. Gary Oakes, "B.C.-based Organization Operates 32 Pro Bono Clinics" Lawyers Weekly 22:25
(1 November 2002) 2.
116. See donalee Moulton, "Reach Nova Scotia: Helping to Change Legal Landscape for Those with
Disabilities" Lawyers Weekly 22:10 (5 July 2002) 1.
117. B.C. Report, supra note 112 at A-I. The Pro Bono Legal Services Survey was jointly conducted
by the Law Society of British Columbia and the Canadian Bar Association. Surveys were sent to
10,330 members. The response rate for this survey was particularly poor with only 619 responses
received (six percent response rate). If the respondents are a random sample of the legal population
in British Columbia, the organisers state that the data should be reliable +/- 3.8%, nineteen times out
of twenty. An evaluation of the responses by the organisers suggested a representative sample.
However, I suggest that these results should be treated very cautiously as a reflection of the current
involvement of practitioners in pro bono work. The survey can be usefully compared with the Pro
Bono Survey conducted by the Victoria Law Foundation, Australia, online: Barrister Survey <http:/
/www.victorialaw.org.au/Probono - BarristerSurvey report.htm/>. The survey asked the pro bono
question to Victorian barristers, a section of the legal population in Victoria. Surveys were sent to
1,380 barristers with a response rate of 16.4 percent. The survey used the Law Council of Australia's
definition of pro bono, which states:
1) A lawyer, without fee or without expectation of a fee or at a reduced fee, advises and/
or represents a client in cases where:
(i) a client has no other access to the courts and the legal system and/or
(ii) the client's case raises a wider issue of public interest; or
2) The lawyer is involved in free community legal education and/or law reform; or
3) The lawyer is involved in the giving of free legal advice and/or representation to
charitable and community organisations.
Ninety percent of the respondents claimed to have undertaken pro bono work in the two year period
prior to the survey; on average the median monthly value of the work was $AU 1500. Of the barris-
ters who practice criminal or family law, 68% believed that cuts to legal aid funding have resulted in
an increase in demand for pro bono services. However, the majority of all respondents stated that
their reason for doing pro bono work was a sense of personal responsibility. Not surprisingly, crimi-
nal law was the most common area of the law in which pro bono work is provided.
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appear promising and the contributions of those who participate must not
be underestimated or undervalued. However, some caution is appropriate.
It is to be noted that the definition of pro bono was "legal services for
persons of limited means or not-for-profit organizations, without expecta-
tion of a fee."' 8 An article reporting on this survey suggests that the
beneficiaries are mostly "non-profit organizations and societies."''
Moreover, lawyers might include within their definition of pro bono:
volunteering for committee membership in legal organizations, continu-
ing legal education, community legal education, 20 and unremunerated
teaching as a sessional lecturer in law schools. Coombs raises the
possibility of "mislabelling."'' Cramton argues that in the United States
"much [of the pro bono] time is directed toward activities that build rela-
tionships with other lawyers ... or work that is designed to attract clients.'
1 22
Elsewhere, it has been suggested that what some lawyers characterize as
pro bono is, in fact, one of the costs of "business-getting.' ' 23 Another
commentator has suggested that in the United States one study found that
one third of the work classified by lawyers as pro bono in fact involved
friends or relatives. 124 It is also worth noting that another American study
suggests that only 10% of American lawyers engage in voluntary pro
bono,125 while another claims that "[r]ecent estimates suggest that most
attorneys do not perform significant pro bono work, and that only between
ten and twenty percent of those who do are assisting low income
clients. The average for the profession as a whole is less than half an hour
per week."' 26 There is even some evidence to indicate that pro bono rates
118. B.C. Report, supra note 112 at 10.
119. Michael Wilhelmson, "Survey of B.C. Lawyers Shows Support for Pro Bono Initiative" Law-
yers Weekly 21:36 (1 February 2002) 22.
120. Buckley, supra note 65 at 87.
121. Mary Coombs, "Your Money or Your Life: A Modest Proposal for Mandatory Pro Bono Ser-
vices" (1993) 3 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 215 at 229.
122. Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", supra note 2 at 1129; see also Cramton, "Ordinary Ameri-
cans", supra note 2 at 578; David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988) at 279 [Luban, Lawyers].
123. Barlow F Christensen, "The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility" (1981) 1 American
Bar Foundation Research Journal I at 11.
124. See Zino I. Macaluso, "That's O.K., this One's on Me: a Discussion of the Responsibilities and
Duties Owed by the Profession to Do Pro Bono Publico Work" (1992) 26 U.B.C. L. Rev. 65 at 70;
see also Deborah L. Rhode, "Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students"
(1999) 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415 at 2423 [Rhode, "Cultures"].
125. See Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, "A Public Assets Theory of Lawyers' Pro Bono Obliga-
tions" (1997) 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245 at 1257, n. 49.
126. Rhode, "Cultures," supra note 124 at 2415.
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have been declining in the United States.'27 It is beyond the scope of this
paper to account for these manifest disparities, but they do raise the
question of whether the highly positive response in British Columbia is
accurate and, more generally, whether anyone truly knows the extent of
pro bono in Canada. 2 '
Fourth, in the last several years there has emerged a national organiza-
tion called Pro Bono Students Canada, which is a "network of law schools
and community organizations that matches law students with public inter-
est and non-governmental organizations, legal clinics, tribunals, agencies
and lawyers who are doing pro bono work."'12 9
Fifth, and finally, there are also elements of mandatory pro bono in
Canada. For example, British Columbia has a dedicated tax of 7.5% on
lawyers' bills to help pay for legal aid. The Law Society of Upper Canada
had a self imposed legal aid levy for 10 years, but, interestingly, it was
eliminated in 1999. It ranged anywhere from $185-292 per year per
lawyer. 130
Although the foregoing pro bono initiatives are an important starting
point, they are manifestly inadequate.' In February 2003 the CBA released
its long awaited report from its Pro Bono Working Group. Unfortunately,
the report and a resolution supporting its recommendations did little
to move the pro bono agenda forward. Assiduously avoiding any sugges-
tion that the CBA might attempt to enforce the pro bono obligations it
had passed in 1998, the report merely recommended that a new adminis-
trative structure be created to enable and assist lawyers to participate in
pro bono work. But it did little to promote direct leadership to engage
lawyers, law firms, law societies and governments in a commitment to pro
bono. Rather than being at the vanguard in the struggle for access to
justice, the report and resolution envision the CBA as little more than an
administrative assistant providing lawyers and law firms with "how to
127. See Kellie Isbell & Sarah Sawle, "Pro Bono Publico: Voluntary Service and Mandatory Report-
ing" (2002) 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 845 at 853-854.
128. The A.B.A. has recently launched a commission to "study the effect of law school debt on
students' ability and willingness to take public interest jobs and to study the effect of billable hours
and salaries on firms' commitment to pro bono work." See ibid. at 854.
129. B.C. Report, supra note 112 at 3-4.
130. Buckley, supra note 65 at 54-55.
131. See Coombs, supra note 121 at 231, n. 47.
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guides" for pro bono work. 132
In the remainder of this article, I propose that these sputtering and in-
choate initiatives to provide pro bono need to be consolidated into a larger,
132. Canadian Bar Association Pro Bono Working Group, Mid- Winter 2003 Report (Ottawa: Cana-
dian Bar Association, 2003), online: CBA Mid-Winter 2003 Report <http://www.cba.org/CBA/pdf/
03-04-M-Background.pdf>. The Working Group was required to report on three matters: the nature
of the pro bono work being performed by members and how to recognize such work, the develop-
ment of a business plan as to how the CBA should design, coordinate, facilitate and promote the pro
bono contributions of its members, and methods of obtaining and sharing information about the pro
bono initiative at the national and branch levels. In August 2002, the Working Group was also asked
to consider whether the CBA should enter into a proposed programme to support pro bono clinics
and develop specific goals and strategies to enable all Canadians who cannot afford a lawyer or
obtain legal aid to obtain free legal advice. In February 2003, the Working Group finally presented
its long awaited report to the CBA Council. The Working Group recommends that the CBA:
* develop template policies for law societies and their insurers;
* encourage each law society and its insurer to permit insurance coverage for pro bono
work for lawyers who are otherwise exempt from insurance coverage, such as public
sector lawyers, corporate counsel and non-practicing or retired lawyers, so that these
persons can participate in the provision of pro bono services;
• develop model practices and checklists for law firm work;
* develop a clearinghouse to inform members of best practices for pro bono delivery on
a sector basis and make this information available on the CBA website;
• explore the need for specialized pro bono services in particular areas of law;
* encourage all law firms to adopt a pro bono policy and to support and promote pro bono
service by their lawyers
* encourage branches to support pro bono activities in their respective jurisdictions by
urging each branch to explore the feasibility of developing an internet based pro bono
delivery system
, undertake a regular survey of CBA members' pro bono activity;
* promote a variety of delivery models to best meet local needs for pro bono services
without endorsing a particular delivery model;
* not directly fund pro bono clinics;
* promote and recognize pro bono work to include issuing a pro bono challenge to law
firms and peer recognition of pro bono activity through a regular feature in the CBA
national magazine.
The Working Group concluded that promoting a pro bono culture within the legal profession is suffi-
ciently important to be an ongoing CBA priority, with a specific group in the organization mandated to
implement the recommendations in its report, raise funds for ongoing initiatives and oversee the work.
This group should be permanently established within the CBA governance structure and must recog-
nize that pro bono work complements, but does not replace, a properly funded legal aid programme.
The CBA Council adopted these recommendations during its February 2003 meeting.
Any strategy to encourage lawyers to contribute their time to the provision of legal advice for needy
Canadians must be commended. However, the Working Group's recommendations are inadequate to
ensure that more lawyers will undertake pro bono work and that that work will be directed to those
individuals who need it most. It amounts to a laissez-faire position that requires the CBA to provide
little direct leadership to engage lawyers, law firms, law societies, the community and governments
in a commitment to pro bono work. The strategies propounded by the report are instrumentalist and
address how to do pro bono work and ensure that pro bono work is done effectively and efficiently
rather than why lawyers and firms should undertake pro bono work. It is unclear just how this pro-
posal will in any measurable way increase lawyers' or law firms' commitment to undertake pro bono
work. At an even more fundamental level, it fails to create a new modality to address access to
justice issues for Canadian citizens by engaging governments, the profession and citizens into a
discussion about a partnership for change.
360 The Dalhousie Law Journal
more coherent ethical obligation. The existence of the obligation will
allow the Canadian legal profession to put pressure on governments to
ameliorate the legal aid crisis.'33 But to do so, it will be necessary to
address the ethical arguments for and against mandatory pro bono.
3. Arguments for mandatory pro bono
Several different types of argument can be mobilized in favour of manda-
tory pro bono. As Deborah Rhode points out, both fights-based and utili-
tarian arguments can be developed in support of mandatory pro bono. The
primary rights-based argument suggests that there is an unmet right to
legal assistance and that, contractually, the legal profession is obliged to
respond to that need because of its privileged monopoly situation. Utilitar-
ian arguments depend more on the distributive benefits and instrumental
consequences of mandatory pro bono.'34 I will address each of these in turn.
a. The Rights Based Argument: Monopoly and the Juridical Contract.
135
Building on Locke's social contract theory,13 6 advocates of mandatory pro
bono suggest that we need to be aware of three potential contracts. First,
there is the contract whereby the citizenry agree among themselves to leave
the state of nature in the pursuit of mutual self interest. Second, there is the
contract between the citizens and the sovereign whereby the latter agrees
to protect the rights of the citizens and to enforce the rule of law. In
contrast to conventional Lockean theory, which had a relatively narrow
and negative conception of rights and the rule of law, modem Canadian
society has a broader conception of what these concepts mean. In several
recent cases the Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to delineate what
is encompassed by the rule of law.'37 Crucial to this exercise is the idea of
equality before the law, 138 that "[t]here is, in short, one law for all."'
1 39
In Canada, we have adopted an expansive definition of what equality means.
133. See also B.C. Report, supra note 112 at 19.
134. Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive Method (Toronto: Little
Brown, 1994) at 26 [Rhode, Professional Responsibility].
135. This subsection is a somewhat modified and Canadianized version of that developed by Luban,
Lawyers, supra note 122 at 241-289.
136. John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, ed. by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1988).
137. See Manitoba Language Rights Reference [19851 1 S.C.R. 721 at 747-752; Reference re Seces-
sion of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at paras 71-73.
138. See B.C. Report, supra note 112 at 19; David Dyzenhaus "Normative Justifications for the
Provision of Legal Aid" in Ontario Legal Aid Review, Report of the Ontario Legal Aid Review: A
Blueprint for Publicly Funded Legal Services, vol. 2 (Ontario: Government of Ontario, 1997).
139. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 137 at para. 71.
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Section 15(1) of the Charter provides:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and as the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
This approach to equality rights is much more encompassing than the
American ideal of "equal justice under the law."' 40 For good or ill, lawyers
are the gatekeepers to providing equal access to the law. The state has
given the legal profession a nationalized monopoly in this regard: lawyers
regulate admission to the profession, engage in legal practice to the exclu-
sion of all others and self-regulate for misconduct.14" ' Thus we come to the
third contract - the juridical contract - that in exchange for their
monopoly, autonomy and independence there is a corresponding obliga-
tion on the legal profession to ensure that there is equal access to law for
all members of the community.'42 Indeed, lawyers swear to honour this
obligation when they take their oath. 4 3 As David Luban has argued:
The lawyer's lucrative monopoly would not exist without the community
and its state; the monopoly and indeed the product it monopolizes is an arti-
fact of the community. The community has shaped the lawyer's retail product
with her in mind; it has made the law to make the lawyer indispensable. The
community, as a consequence, has the right to condition its handiwork on the
recipients of the monopoly fulfilling the monopoly's legitimate purpose.'
4
140. Luban, Lawyers, supra note 122 at 252.
141. See generally Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", supra note 2 at 1126; Cramton, "Ordinary
Americans" supra note 2 at 606-607; Christensen, supra note 123 at 14-18; Marrero Report, supra
note 2 at 782-783.
142. Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", ibid. at 1134-1135. My conception of this entitlement is
equal access to basic legal services, specifically criminal matters, housing issues, family issues,
employment matters and consumer matters.
143. See by-law 11, section 6.(6)1 of the Law Society of Upper Canada, which states: "Barristers
Oath: You are called to the Degree of Barrister-at-law to protect and defend the rights and interest of
such citizens as may employ you. You shall conduct all cases faithfully and to the best of your
ability. You shall neglect no one's interest nor seek to destroy any one's property. You shall not be
guilty of champerty or maintenance. You shall not refuse causes of complaint reasonably founded,
nor shall you promote suits upon frivolous pretences. You shall not pervert the law to favour or
prejudice any one, but in all things shall conduct yourself truly and with integrity. In fine, the Queen's
interest and the interest of citizens you shall uphold and maintain according to the constitution and
law of this Province. All this you do swear to observe and perform to the best of your knowledge and
ability. So help you God." [emphasis added]
144. Luban, Lawyers, supra note 122 at 286. Recently, Luban has recast his argument slightly, sug-
gesting that if lawyers are not a monopoly they are an oligopoly, and that they are "trustees adminis-
tering the actual distribution of law." See David Luban, "Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of
Identity" (1999) 49 J. Legal Educ. 58 at 63-66 [Luban, "Faculty"].
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The idea of special status engendering special responsibilities 45 is given
even more concrete, quasi-economic form in Lubet and Stewart's "public
assets theory."'1 46 They argue that lawyers are essentially concessionaires,
in that the state grants to them exclusive access to certain publically
created commodities - including rights of confidentiality, loyalty,
lawyer-client privilege, and conflict of interest rules - which they then
sell for profit to clients. In other words, a significant portion of the legal
profession's income is based upon these specially designated lawyer
commodities, which should be compensated by way of a user fee or
commission in the form of a contribution to the public good. This
monopoly has directly translated into the fact that lawyers, as a group,
tend to be extremely well paid relative to other members of the public. 1
4 7
Moreover, as I have indicated, a significant portion of many lawyers' sala-
ries comes from the public purse, either as a consequence of contracting
145. Rhode, Professional Responsibility, supra note 134 at 545.
146. Lubet & Stewart, supra note 125.
147. It is always somewhat risky to generalize about incomes of a particular group, especially given
the fragmented status of the legal profession. However, consider the following: Statistics Canada
reported that the average lawyer earned $75,200 per year (1996 Census data). Revenue Canada
1997 information shows the average Canadian lawyer's income to be $96,962. This is the data for
all age groups, however, for peak earners between the ages of 44 and 56 years old, the average salary
was $118,998 in 1997. And, as with most other professions, male lawyers earned more than female
lawyers in the same positions covering the same caseloads. Males in the peak age group earned an
average of $109,200 per year, while females in the same group earned $55,600 per year. At the entry
level (age 25 to 29) the salary difference is much less, with an average of $31,300 for men compared
to $28,400 for women [It should be mentioned that male lawyers put in more hours per year than
female lawyers (2,300 hours for men and 1,950 hours for women).] See Monique Conrod, "Compen-
sation Trends in the Legal PTofession" Canadian Lawyer 26:5 (May 2002) 41 at 41.)
Rates differ among the various provinces in Canada. Lawyers' earnings in the peak age group dif-
fered depending on the geographical region in which the lawyer worked ranging from PE.I., where
peak age group lawyers earned an average of $113,700 per year, to Ontario, where they earned an
average of $200,565 per year (1997). According to Canadian Lawyer magazine the median rate of
pay for an associate was $38,750 per year in 1997 while partners could earn up to $450,000 in one
year alone (Conrod, ibid. at 42).
As for billing hours across Canada, Canadian Lawyer's 2000 survey states that "annual billable hour
targets for both partners and associates are moving to achievable levels;" see Casey Watson, "The
2000 Canadian Lawyer National Compensation Survey" Canadian Lawyer 24:6 (June 2000) 25 at
26. According to this survey, "For most solo practitioners and law firms, the targets for annual bill-
able hours are quite reasonable. The average for partners this year is 1,400 and 1,300 for associates.
Most respondents say there are few problems hitting those figures. As in previous years, though, it
should be noted that partner incomes are larger in firms with higher targets - about $50, 000 - $100,
000 more" (ibid. at 25).
In-house counsel, although similar in many respects to private lawyers practice, differ in terms of
remuneration and should be dealt with separately. Generally, salaries are higher among all groups,
specifically the base salaries of associate counsel and junior lawyers. While salaries are slightly
lower in some industries, the sky's the limit when it comes to salary maximums. With the exception
of counsel working in natural resources, salaries for counsel range from $90,000 to $300,000. See
Kirsten McMahon, "Corporate Dividends: 2002 In-House Counsel Compensation Survey" Cana-
dian Lawyer 26:5 (May 2002) 12.
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out or as recipients of legal aid disbursements.
Furthermore, the education of most Canadian lawyers has been
subsidized by the state. Until recently, law school fees have been quite low,
accounting for a fraction of the cost of the education provided. While it is true
that there has been a significant increase in fees over the last few years, the vast
majority of lawyers have been able to maximize their private wealth on the
basis of a public investment in their professional training.
In short, the practice of law in Canada is not, and never has been, a
private practice freely playing in the competitive marketplace; on the
contrary, it is a state created and facilitated privilege and advantage. As
Katzmann summarizes the argument:
The state grants.., autonomy, an effective monopoly, in exchange for law-
yers, as officers of the court, discharging their duty to further equality
before the law... A lawyer's duty to serve those unable to pay is thus not
an act of charity or benevolence, but rather one of professional responsi-
bility, reinforced by the terms under which the state may grant to the pro-
fession effective control of the legal system.
4
A similar point has been made by Dickson J. [as he then was] when he
argued: "[i]mplicit in the legislative grants of self government and
monopoly is concern for the protection of the public interest. Monopoly is
only a means to an end, and that end is service to the public.'
'1 49
Despite this monopoly situation, there are no distinct rules of professional
conduct which require lawyers to provide legal services to those of lesser means.
Rather there are just aspirational propositions. As MacKenzie notes:
Canadian rules of professional conduct recognize that lawyers have a
general duty to break down barriers to equal access to legal services, but
fall short of prescribing such specific duties as acting for reduced or no
fees to accomplish that objective.Thus, while lawyers are enjoined to
'encourage respect for and try to improve the administration of justice'
(CBA Code, chapter XIII, rule; Ontario rule 11), to have 'a basic commit-
ment to the concept of equal justice for all' (CBA Code, chapter XIII,
commentary 1; Ontario rule 11, commentary 2), and to 'make legal
services available to the public in an efficient and convenient manner'
(CBA Code, chapter XIV, rule; Ontario rule 12(1)), the rules make it clear
that lawyers have a general right to decline a particular employment' (CBA
Code, chapter XIV, commentary 6; Ontario rule 12, commentary 5), and
that whether they wish to participate in legal aid plans and other
148. Katzmann, supra note 55 at 6-7.
149. Mr. Justice Brian Dickson, "The Public Responsibilities of Lawyers" (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 175.
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programmes designed to provide legal representation or public education
or advice, is entirely up to them (CBA Code, chapter XIV, commentary 5;
Ontario rule 12, commentary 3).Is °
Moreover, lawyers have not been passive recipients of such a monopoly
but have proactively encouraged it. Lawyers have resented and resisted
paralegals and other non-lawyer agents and this is reflected in legislation
in many provinces.15" ' It might be possible to deregulate a significant
number of legal services (wills, probate, real estate closing, uncontested
divorces, title searches) so that they could be performed either by other
professionals or even laypersons"' at significantly reduced costs, thereby
increasing access to justice for at least some matters.I53 As one American
commentator has suggested, lawyers cannot have it both ways:
they may accept their roles as public servants and shoulder the burden of
bridging the gap between needs and services; or they may characterize
themselves as business people and yield their monopoly of the legal
services market, thus opening up to competition from non-lawyers and
fostering a more available, more affordable market. 15 4
b. Utilitarian Arguments: Distributive and Instrumental Benefit
Deborah Rhode has succinctly summarized the possible distributive ben-
efits of mandatory pro bono as follows:
promoting more just outcomes in legal disputes; enabling more individu-
als to enforce their entitlements to crucial benefits; enhancing the legiti-
macy of the legal system; increasing public regard for lawyers; and ex-
panding attorneys' awareness of how the law functions, or fails to func-
tion, for subordinate groups.'55
150. Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto:
Carswell, 1999) at 9-2.
151. See generally Madam Justice Marguerite Trussler, "A Judicial View on Self Represented Liti-
gants" (Paper presented to New Brunswick Judges, June 2002) [unpublished, on file with author] at
9-13; Julius Melnitzner, "Paralegals: the Turf War Lawyers Can't Win" Canadian Lawyer 26:8 (Au-
gust 2002) 39; "B.C. Law Society Goes After Workers Comp. Consultants" Canadian Lawyer 26:8
(August 2002) 7.
152. Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", supra note 2 at 1136-1139; Cramton, "Ordinary Americans",
supra note 2 at 609, 615.
153. Luban, Lawyers, supra note 122 at 247, 269-273.
154. Karen E. Kelleher, "The Availability Crisis in Legal Services: A Turning Point for the Profes-
sion" (1993) 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 953 at 976; see also Mr. Justice J.C. Major, "Lawyers' Obligation
to Provide Legal Services" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 719 at 728.
155. Rhode, Professional Responsibility, supra note 134 at 26.
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From a different perspective, several commentators have argued that
there are a number of instrumental values for individuals and institutions
to be gained from pro bono work. For example, the Brookings Institution
in the United States has argued that pro bono can be in the self-interest of
both lawyers and law firms.'56 For individual lawyers, the quality of their
lives can be improved, their morale can be boosted, legal skills can be
developed and enhanced, networks can be created, and social capital can
be increased.'57 Moreover, it can be argued that pro bono is also beneficial
for law firms because it enables them to recruit talented junior lawyers
who aspire to something more than the treadmill of maximizing billable
hours; intensify the productivity of a more experienced, mature, imagina-
tive, responsible and talented staff; enhance employee satisfaction with,
and loyalty to, the firm; and project a positive public image that can be a
marketing asset in a competitive environment."5 8 One English commenta-
tor has characterized such arguments as motivated by "enlightened self-
interest." '159
However, as I will discuss in the next section, not everyone is
persuaded by such arguments.
156. Katzmann, supra note 55; see also B.C. Report, supra note 112 at 12; Rhode, "Cultures", supra
note 124 at 2420; Isbell & Sawle, supra note 127.
157. Macaluso, supra note 124; Nadine Strossen, "Pro Bono Legal Work: For the Good Not Only of
the Public, But Also the Lawyer and the Legal Profession" (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2122; Harris
quotes a Hindu poem in support of the "feel good" argument: "I slept, and I dreamed ofjoy, I awoke,
and I did my duty, and therein I found joy," in Harris, "Organization", supra note 63.
158. There are some problems with definitively establishing these benefits as many of these claims
are made on the basis of anecdotal evidence. Moreover, the analysis may be somewhat paternalistic
and therefore is not being advanced or assumed or relied upon in this paper. See also Atkinson, supra
note 107 at 140-141.
159. Smith notes that:
"[Allen and Overy's] full-time co-ordinator provides a hard-headed rationale for [its] pro
bono work, citing the following benefits, a nicely balanced statement of enlightened
self-interest:
* Professional obligation;
* The work provides an interesting way to develop skills. It breaks the insularity of many
elements of corporate practice and fosters a cross-fertilisation of knowledge, skills and
client contact. The value is such that consideration of pro bono work is included within
staff appraisal as a way of seeking to inculcate a culture;
* Marketing - the report is used at beauty parades and potential clients do sometimes ask
about pro bono. The report also allows clients to be told of the firm's commitment.
* Recruitment and retention - it does help to keep staff interested and engaged.
* Fostering of a sense of community with the firm. A very evident indication of this is
shown in the weekly newsletter circulated around the firm where the coverage of pro
bono work is content that is accessible to all.
Thus, the firm manages to combine an impressive commitment to the delivery of free
services with a very clear-eyed view of the importance of those services to itself."
Roger Smith, "Pro Bono Legal Services in England and Wales" (Paper presented to Legal Aid
Roundtable at Osgoode Hall Law School, 1 November 2002) [unpublished, on file with author] at 9.
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4. Arguments Against Mandatory Pro Bono
Opponents of mandatory pro bono have identified at least eight possible
objections. While several raise legitimate concerns, others are premised
upon mistaken assumptions. None, however, are fatal to the idea of
mandatory pro bono, properly understood and flexibly institutionalized.
a. Autonomy
This rights-based argument is often advanced in response to the monopoly
argument outlined previously. Lawyers have rights too; they should
neither be conscripted to provide services without remuneration nor
compelled to work for someone who is not of their choosing, for this
infringes their right of self determination. It is inappropriate to put the
burden of access to justice on lawyers alone: "[i]f society wishes to
expand legal access, society as a whole should pay the cost."'
160
This is an important argument that requires careful consideration.
Usually it is bolstered by analogies to doctors or cab drivers who are also
said to be beneficiaries of state-created monopolies, but do not face any
pro bono requirements. 161 However, several counterarguments might be
made. First, arguing that lawyers should not have to perform pro bono
because doctors or cab drivers do not simply avoids the issue. Second,
neither doctors nor cab drivers have the same "public assets" of confiden-
tiality and privacy as lawyers. 162 Third, and closely related, the legal
profession's power of self-regulation is distinct from other professions in
that it is explicitly justified on the basis of the public interest. 63 Fourth, the
analogy to doctors might backfire. Recently, in response to a shortage of
doctors in emergency wards, Quebec introduced Bill 114 which empowers
the government to force doctors to provide services in emergency rooms
on the basis of social necessity."6 Fifth, the argument relies on an impov-
erished conception of autonomy. Several relational theorists have rejected
"the autonomy as freedom from" metaphor to demonstrate that autonomy
is always relational and contextual and therefore embedded in obligations
160. Rhode, Professional Responsibility, supra note 134 at 27; Suzanne Bretz, "Why Mandatory Pro
Bono is a Bad Idea" (1990) 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 623; Luban, Lawyers, supra note 122 at 285; Erika
Martin-Doyle, "Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1: One Small, but Needed, Step for
Lawyers, An Even Smaller Step for the Commonwealth's Poor" (1994) 9 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 53 at 57.
161. Bretz, ibid. at 628, n. 152.
162. Lubet & Stewart, supra note 125.
163. Stephen Gillers, "Words Into Deeds: Counselor, Can You Spare a Buck?" (1990) 76: Nov. A.B.A.J.
80 at 81.
164. Bill 114, An Act to ensure the continued provision of emergency medical services, 2d Sess., 36th
Leg., Quebec, 2001.
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of interdependence and reciprocity. 165 Lawyers are never truly autonomous
as they are only free to practice law in the context of the society in which
they operate, a society which makes legal relations and lawyers' services
not just possible but unavoidable.
Other opponents of mandatory pro bono have questioned the assump-
tion of whether lawyers truly exercise a monopoly. To bolster this argu-
ment, they argue that litigants can be self-represented, 66 that the large num-
ber of lawyers in the marketplace makes for strong competition, 67 that
there has been an easing of the restraints on internal competition, and that
some other market players do provide legal services. 68 Such arguments
are unpersuasive: the vast majority of self-represented litigants are clearly
at a disadvantage, and while it may be true that there is some competition
within the legal profession, this has not kept the cost of legal services
down. Furthermore, these arguments ignore the reality that only lawyers
can provide legal advice on the vast majority of legal issues. Indeed as one
African-American lawyer has recently noted, "few, if any, attorneys will
compete to represent indigent clients ... [and] no amount of competition
will provide assistance to the truly indigent."'
69
b. Necessity
It is often suggested that the economics of law practice make demands for
pro bono unrealistic. Such an argument is usually made by way of asser-
tion rather than through empirical proof. However, one cautious (and
admittedly limited) study of large firms in the United States found that pro
bono is "not incompatible with the flourishing of the large law firm."'
70
Another commentator has argued that the real costs are greatly exagger-
ated and do not factor in the intangible benefits. 7 ' Smaller firms are said
165. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990); Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship" (1993) 1
Rev. Const. Stud. 1.
166. Bretz, supra note 160 at 628; Martin-Doyle, supra note 160 at 57; Omar J. Arcia, "Objections,
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22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 771 at 780-781.
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(1992) 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1115 at 1121-1122; David L. Shapiro, "The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty
to Serve" (1980) 55 N.YU. L. Rev. 735 at 776-777; Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, "Re-
thinking 'Professionalism"' (1992) 41 Emory L.J. 403 at 411-412, 421.
168. Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", supra note 2 at 1135-1136.
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19 N. 11. U.L. Rev. 287 at 306, 322, n. 233 [Harris, "Make Lawyers Happy"].
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to face particularly high costs because of tighter profit margins, higher
administrative costs and minimal flexibility. However, as I shall argue later,
there may be ways of designing pro bono programmes that do not unduly
burden small firm lawyers and may redistribute the cost of providing legal
services for the disadvantaged to some of the deeper pockets within the
legal profession. Indeed, my approach explicitly recognizes and values
the contributions - both in kind and financial - of lawyers who work at
the lower end of the stratified legal profession and, as such, will not add to
their burdens.172
c. Unfairness
There are two aspects to this argument. The first is connected to the
necessity argument just analyzed. It is sometimes suggested that given
the fragmentation and inequalities within the legal profession it is unfair
to impose mandatory pro bono on all lawyers. It has been argued that it
is easier for larger firms and wealthier lawyers to absorb the cost of pro bono
than for smaller firms and less affluent lawyers.' 73 Moreover, there is
already a significant cadre of lawyers, particularly in the criminal, family and
immigration fields, who are already helping the disadvantaged.'74 There is
merit in this concern. However, it seems to me that if, as I suggest later, we
can devise a flexible system of mandatory pro bono - for example, by pro
rating to salary/seniority, allowing for buy outs or pro bono credits - then
this is not an absolute bar. Indeed, mandatory pro bono can be viewed as a
way of redistributing the burden within the profession, from the lower ech-
elons to the higher echelons, thereby marginally decreasing the inequalities.
Coombs characterizes this as a form of "professional cross-subsidization".'75
The second unfairness argument is that the costs of pro bono will not
really be borne by lawyers but will be redistributed to paying clients. This
consequence would be unfair not only because it would be an arbitrary and
unprincipled imposition of a tax upon those who pay,'76 but also because
this additional cost would make access to legal services unattainable for
even more people.'77 This "robbing Peter to pay Paul" argument is a real
172. It has also been suggested that in the long run mandatory pro bono may create more paid work
for larger firms on the theory that if the disadvantaged begin to litigate on the basis of pro bono, the
defendants are likely to be landlords, creditors, etc., who will need to hire lawyers, and these will
likely be from the larger firms. See Arcia, supra note 166 at 788.
173. Luban, Lawyers, supra note 122 at 278; Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", supra note 2 at 1137;
Cramton, "Ordinary Americans", supra note 2 at 585; Macey, supra note 167 at 1116, 1119-1121.
174. Coombs, supra note 121 at 217; Atkinson, supra note 107 at 148-149.
175. Coombs, ibid. at 221.
176. Shapiro, supra note 167 at 781; Atkinson, supra note 107 at 147-148.
177. Buckley, supra note 65 at 50; Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", supra note 2 at 1130; Macaluso,
supra note 124 at 79; Shapiro, ibid. at 783.
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danger, but on a redistributive justice basis it can be argued that this disad-
vantage will be offset by the benefits reaped from a mandatory pro bono
scheme that also helps to redistribute some of the wealth generated by the
new economy from the top of the social hierarchy to those further down.
d. Competence
Codes of ethics impose a responsibility on lawyers to engage only in prac-
tice where they are suitably competent. 78 As a result of specialization, it
may be that some lawyers have little they can offer to the disempowered.
Consequently, it is argued that it is inappropriate to foist low quality
service on the disadvantaged.'79 It is probably true that a tax lawyer who
specializes in international transactions can be of little assistance to a
disabled person with an accessibility issue, and they are likely to be ineffi-
cient.180 But there are three responses to the competency objection. First,
competency is a comparative concept - would not limited competency
be preferable to no legal representation at all?18" ' Despite specialization,
many lawyers do have the general skills required by many of the disadvan-
taged.' 182 Second, many of the legal problems of the disadvantaged can be
addressed if the lawyer is at all competent and is willing to invest some
time in developing new skills and knowledge.'83 Such skills can probably
be utilized with other similarly disadvantaged persons.'84 Third, as I will
suggest later, pro bono need not be the actual provision of in-kind legal
services, but could be based upon a tax on lawyers or buy out options.
e. Inefficiency/Impractical
Deborah Rhode nicely summarizes this objection as follows:
Pro bono obligations are not an efficient way of realizing the benefits of
broadened access. Lawyers who lack expertise and motivation to serve
under-represented groups will not provide cost-effective representation.
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Handbook, online: Nova Scotia Barristers Society <http://www.n.s.b.s.NS.ca/handbook/chapter2>.
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Requiring lawyers to provide a minimal level of services of largely
unverifable quality cannot begin to meet [the] nation's massive problem
of unmet legal need. Worse still, such token responses to distributional
inequalities may deflect attention from the fundamental problems that
remain and from more productive ways of addressing them. Preferable
strategies might include simplification of legal procedures, expanded
subsidies for poverty law programs, and elimination of the professional
monopoly over routine legal services.'
Moreover, it is suggested that it would be administratively impractical
to coordinate the provision of pro bono services, monitor the quality of the
service provided by a lawyer or to ensure there is compliance with any
minimal requirements.' 6 Unlike most of the previous arguments, these
objections come from the left, from those who are skeptical of over-em-
phasizing the role of lawyers at the expense of a more profound re-organi-
zation of legal services. Again, these are legitimate concerns, but it seems
to me that realistically large scale reorganization is highly unlikely in the
current politico-economic environment. More specifically, some of the
criticisms only apply if pro bono is assumed to be in kind. However, as I
will argue in Part IV, pro bono can be more flexible than this." 7 Moreover,
the coordination problem may be resolvable by building upon the Pro Bono
Net initiatives already underway in British Columbia and Ontario.'s
f. Inherently Contradictory
Opponents of mandatory pro bono often suggest that the term is an oxy-
moron, as the essence of pro bono is its voluntary quality. 89 The coercive
and conscriptive dimensions of a mandatory system undercut the moral
ideals of personal growth and fulfillment. Two counterpoints can be made.
First, pro bono has no necessary essence; it need not be conceived of as
being about the interests of lawyers, but rather about the impact on recipi-
ents. Second, the evidence from the United States indicates that voluntary
185. Rhode, Professional Responsibility, supra note 134 at 27.
186. Bretz, supra note 160 at 633-634; Esther F. Lardent, "Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The
Wrong Answer to the Right Question" (1990) 49 Md. L. Rev. 78 at 99-100; Luban, Lawyers, supra
note 122 at 278-279; Marrero Report, supra note 2 at 821; Cramton, "Mandatory Pro Bono", supra
note 2 at 1128; Shapiro, supra note 167 at 785.
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success in overcoming these administrative problems. See also Isbell & Sawle, supra note 127 at
858-859 and their discussion of Florida's mandatory reporting system (ibid. at 860-863).
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initiatives systematically fail. 190 In several American jurisdictions manda-
tory pro bono has been resisted and legal organizations have argued that
voluntary initiatives can fill the gap. However, the pattern appears to be
that while there is a spike in voluntary pro bono when mandatory pro bono
is proposed, within a few years volunteer rates drop significantly.' 9' As the
Marrero Report in New York commented:
... the 'voluntarism' so eloquently extolled and advocated by the orga-
nized Bar may well amount to little more than a rallying cry for the status
quo. When all is said and done, only the same disappointingly small pro-
portion of practicing attorneys who can contribute pro bono efforts to the
poor would be counted upon to continue bearing the full load for the rest
of the legal profession.'92
g. Scope
It may be argued that there are a significant number of lawyers who do not
fit nicely with either the monopoly analysis or public assets theory. These
might include in-house corporate counsel, government lawyers and law
professors. Because they are not providing direct legal advice or selling
privacy, they are outside the equation. In response, it can be suggested that
these lawyers are still direct beneficiaries of the legal regime. In-house
counsel and government lawyers still provide some legal advice or have
skills that are directly related to their legal training; and law professors, to
be blunt, are parasites whose professional existence is dependent upon the
continued market demand for legal services.'93 As beneficiaries, they too
must accept their burden.
h. The Soup Kitchen Argument: Why Legal Services?
The final argument against mandatory pro bono legal services is not an
argument in principle against mandatory pro bono, but asks whether a
lawyer's pro bono contributions should necessarily be funneled into legal
services. Why cannot other socially positive contributions - for example,
helping in a soup kitchen - be adequate? 94
Again, several counterarguments might be suggested. First, there is
190. See Coombs, ibid. at 225, n. 28; Christensen, supra note 123 at 17-18; Lardent, supra note 186
at 88-92.
19 1. See Janet Stidman Eveleth, "The Great Pro Bono Debate" (2002) 35: Jun. Md. B. J. 46; Marrero
Report, supra note 2 at 777, 822-829.
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nothing about mandatory pro bono legal services which precludes lawyers
from engaging in other additional pro bono contributions. Second, because
legal pro bono need not be in kind, lawyers can have sufficient opportuni-
ties to engage in other services, if they choose to do so. Third, lawyers
have unique - indeed exclusive - skills and rights as officers of the
court that other members of the public do not possess and which the
disempowered need. Fourth, and finally, the assumption underlying this
view is that pro bono legal services are a charitable donation, and there-
fore morally fungible with other charitable contributions.'95 However, in
this paper I have assiduously avoided characterizing pro bono legal
services as charitable in nature; rather, they are a duty that emerges from
the special privileges that are given to lawyers.
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IV. A New Strategy For The New Economy: Mandatory Pro Bono And The
Social Investment State
The leadership of the profession has done a good job of identifying the
"false savings" and "costs of inadequate legal aid":
• the costs of those who are unfairly imprisoned or denied the ability
to earn a living due to a criminal record that could have been avoided;
• the costs to the state of caring for children who are unnecessarily
made wards of the state;
* the costs of safeguarding and caring for women who are unable to
access legal protection from abusive spouses; and
• the costs of supporting single parents who are unable to reap the
benefits of support provisions in the law.
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These costs can be repackaged in the discourse of the "social invest-
ment state." It is not just about saving money; it is about investing in a
system - legal aid - that enables citizens to be less vulnerable, less
dependent, more efficient, and more productive. However, as I have
argued, the social investment state is not the welfare state; legal aid is seen
195. It may be worth noting that one commentator has traced this charitable conception of pro bono
to Aquinas characterizing it as "a corporal work of mercy that is very personal." See Macey, supra
note 167 at 115, n. 4. This charitable assumption seems to persist in the B.C. Report (supra note 112
at 18) and among leaders of the legal profession. See Gregory D. Goulin, "Charitable Justice" Law-
yers Weekly 22:18 (13 September 2002) 5.
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as a soft policy option which does not garner much public support. But, as
I emphasized in Part I, the social investment state is keen to engage in
partnerships. 19 Thus, it is argued that as a complementary strategy, the
legal profession should adopt a policy of mandatory pro bono in partner-
ship with government funders.' 99 If the legal profession can demonstrate a
robust pro bono culture it can take advantage of this discursive policy open-
ing to promote legal access policies that dovetail with the social invest-
ment state's rhetoric of partnership and contribution. 0
For example, in recent years there have been suggestions from the CBA
and members of the bar that the government might support pro bono work
by giving lawyers a tax credit - a charitable donation credit - for work
they do for legal aid,20 establishing a contingency legal aid fund, and
creating a disbursement fund for lawyers who do pro bono work. 202 These
are proposals worthy of consideration, but even if they were successfully
implemented, only a relatively small percentage of the legal profession
would participate. If, however, the profession were to make a commitment
for all lawyers to engage in pro bono work for the disadvantaged, then the
partnership between government and the profession might have signifi-
cantly greater impact.
203
It may be, however, that not all lawyers are well-suited to providing in
kind pro bono. Consequently, it is suggested that lawyers should be given
a time-or-money option: they can buy themselves out of legal aid by
contributing to a fund that the government commits to being used exclu-
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sively for legal aid purposes. 2°4 There are at least three alternative options
available in such a monetary contribution system. First, all lawyers could
contribute a percentage of their total billings. This was a suggestion of the
Canadian Bar Association when it proposed "the development of a policy
which requires or encourages each member to contribute 50 hours or 3%
of billings per year to pro bono work, aimed at assisting the disadvan-
taged."2 5 Second, all lawyers could be required to pay a standard percent-
age of their annual earnings into a fund for legal aid services. Or third,
lawyers would be taxed differentially depending on their level of employ-
ment.20 6 Entry level lawyers would pay a lower percentage for the first five
or ten years of practice as during these early years their earnings are rela-
tively low, their expenses relatively high (e.g., purchase of a first car, first
home) and most will be simultaneously paying off their student loans for a
number of years. In return, experienced associates and partners would pay
a higher percentage of their total earnings into this pool.
207
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop the details of such a
scheme, but such practices have been in place in at least one province,
British Columbia, and are clearly feasible.
208
Conclusion
"Truth is, the legal profession has always been an alloy of lucre and
magnanimity." 09
The new economy does not create a new problem for the legal profes-
sion in the context of access to justice. Rather, it rekindles, and perhaps
intensifies, an old problem. The welfare state allowed the profession, as a
profession, to engage in an exercise in confession and avoidance:
204. In British Columbia lawyers have been paying a 7.5% tax on their billings. However, recent
governments have been putting this in the general revenue. See Owen Lippert, "The Unprecedented
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206. This is also supported by an efficiency argument. Previously in this paper, in Section IV4.d., it
was suggested that in light of competency concerns lawyers might be entitled to buy out options. In
a suggested prorated system those lawyers who might be the least "useful" to the disadvantaged
might also be among the highest earning, hence their contributions would be that much greater. See
Atkinson, supra note 107 at 142-143.
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Yes, structural inequalities impede access to justice; but no, it is not the
responsibility of the profession to try to remedy that problem. The state
has the responsibility to ensure access to justice through the provision of
adequate legal aid. If individual lawyers choose to engage in pro bono,
that is laudable; however, pro bono is not of the essence to the legal pro-
fession, and those who do not engage in pro bono are not to be criticized.
Now, however, with the retreat of the welfare state, the legal profes-
sion can no longer claim moral or political innocence. The new economy,
access to justice and ethical obligations are not just questions of econom-
ics or cultural norms, they are issues of politics. The new economy is about
the redistribution of power and wealth in society. The Canadian legal
profession cannot avoid or transcend these politics. The legal professions
in other countries have recognized these challenges, and realizing that the
politics of denunciation alone cannot fill the void, they have begun to
experiment. 210 In this paper, I have argued that while the new economy
paints a grim picture for access to justice, there is still space for the legal
profession to mobilize within the discourses and practices of the social
investment state. But political engagement will not be cost free.
21
Nor will it fully resolve the problem of access to justice where there is
clearly a vitally important role for the state to increase its contributions.
21 2
Nevertheless, the Canadian legal profession can choose to be part of an
attempt to minimize the injustices inflicted by the new economy ... or not.
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